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PREFACE

Expanding Reach: The Importance of
Batson v. KentuckyThirty Years On
Melynda f Pricy
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL soliciting suggestions
a commemoration of Batson v. Kentucky on
proposed
for the 2016 Symposium, I
Supreme Court decision.' I have written
landmark
of
this
the thirtieth anniversary
my
career. 2 The decision and the structures
throughout
about Batson v. Kentucky
put in place to enforce that decision fumdamentally changed the way in which voir
dire was conducted in United States courtrooms. It had long been understood that
litigants had a constitutional right to challenge jurors with legally permitted causes
typically delineated by statute. Peremptory challenges, because of their
discretionary nature, extended the scope of removal beyond those articulated in the

When the call came from the

statute.

Although peremptory strikes are considered an important part of the art of
lawyering, they have been much more debated and less regulated than challenges
for cause. Batson marks a steep departure from the broad discretion lawyers have
had in using hunches, experience, and/or instincts in making critical decisions

' Melynda J. Price is the Robert E. Harding, Jr. Professor of Law and Director of African American
and Africana Studies at the University of Kentucky. She is currently a fellow in the Law and Public
Affairs Program at Princeton University. If you have any questions about the ideas presented here,
please contact the author at melynda.price@uky.edu.
' See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
forbids prosecutors from challenging jurors solely on account of race).
2 See, e.g., MELYNDA J. PRICE, AT THE CROSS: RACE, RELIGION, & CITIZENSHIP IN THE
POLITICS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 41-68 (2015) (discussing Batson hearings in the context of capital
jury selection); Melynda J. Price, PerforningDiscretion or PerformingDiscrimination:Race, Ritual,
and Peremptory Challengesin CapitallurySelection, 15 MICH. J. RACE &L. 57 (2009) (examining use
of Batson bearings in capital trials) [hereinafter Price, Performing Discretion or Performing
Discrimination];Melynda J. Price, Polcing the Borders ofDemocracy: The ContinuingRole ofBatson
in Protectingthe Citizensh4 Rights ofthe Excluded, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1635 (2012).
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about jury composition. Batson follows previous unsuccessfl attempts to push the
Court on the idea that substantial intervention was required in this historic
practice.' The Court had long articulated a dear rule that Blacks could not be
struck for cause based on race. 4 Not wanting to see the replication of the conditions
of slavery through statutory regimes, the Court viewed the restriction of access to
the jury as an important right, and it was one of the few participatory rights
protected during that period. It is important to remark that the ferocity of Jim
Crow meant the Supreme Court's decisions had little effect in practice until the
sweeping changes in the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. The changes
associated with these larger political movements removed bureaucratic and formal
barriers to the jury box, but had little impact on discretionary tools like peremptory
challenges. Peremptory challenges were still utilized as a highly effective tool to
deny Blacks access to the jury box. 5
Batson brought the question of whether the Constitution forbids the use of race
as a factor in discretionary strikes to the Supreme Court.6 The Court answers with
a resounding yes, making clear that racially motivated peremptory challenges are
unconstitutional.' Batson was not the first to recognize this; but Batson was the
first to make clear that the harm to the defendant could be evaluated by the

In Swain, the court explains peremptory challenges with the following: "The essential nature of
the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without
being subject to the court's control." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citing State v.
Thompson, 206 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. 1949); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,378 (1892)).
4 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879), abrogatedbyTaylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530 (1975) ("Concluding, therefore, that the statute of West Virginia, discriminating in the
selection of jurors, as it does, against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal
protection of the laws to a colored man .... ).
s Peremptory challenges were also used to exclude women in significant numbers. See, e.g., J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143-44, 146 (1994). It is always important to mention that this
right of citizenship was not fully extended to African American women at the time Strauder was
decided, and for all women, the right to participate and juries would not be expanded until the 1970s.
For example, Louisiana had a statute excluding women from jury service unless they filed a declaration
saying they wanted to be considered for service. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 402 (1966)
(repealed 1974). The Court found, at the time of the petitioner's trial in Taylor v. Louisiana, there were
no women on the venire despite being fifty-three percent of the population in the judicial district. 419
U.S. 522, 525-26 (1975). In 1979, the Supreme Court held a Missouri law that permitted women to be
exempted from jury duty, if they wished, to be unconstitutional. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 355, 360
(1979). The law resulted in only 14.5% of the post-summons venire being comprised of women, and the
petitioner claimed the paucity of women in the venire denied his right to have his case heard by a fair
cross-section of the community. Id. at 362-63. The Supreme Court did not recognize female jurors of
all races as having a right against sex discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges until JE.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. TB. See 511 U.S. at 129-31. Despite attaining suffrage, women were barred from jury
service completely in many states with Alabama being one of the last to recognize the specific jury rights
of women in 1966. Id. at 131 n.3.
6 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
7
See id. at 99_100.
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behavior of the lawyers within a particular trial.' Prior to Batson, the amount of
time and effort, as well as the high legal standard, made a showing of
discrimination often an insurmountable obstacle to making a successful objection.
In his concurring opinion in Batson, Justice Thurgood Marshall provides several
examples where defendants attempted to mount such claims.' In one instance, the
defendant's claim included evidence that during a single year in Dallas County,
0
Texas, prosecutors struck 405 out of 467 black jurors with peremptory challenges.'
Even this showing was not sufficient proof of racially motivated peremptory
challenges under the leading decision at the time, Swain v. Alabama.n Most
defendants could not afford the investigation required to prove systematic
discrimination. 1 2 Batson created a new process for evaluating the use of peremptory
challenges against racial minorities in particular cases where that harm occurs."
Batson focuses the question of proof on an inquiry of racial discrimination in
the case and the prosecutor before the court, removing the need to prove
discrimination across cases and across time. To make a showing of racial bias in the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, according to Batson, defendants must
demonstrate 1) they are a "member of a cognizable racial group" 14 and "that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members
of the defendant's race" 5 ; 2) "peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate'";"
' See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 223. Swain is mentioned more than thirty-five times in the majority
opinion in Batson. See generallyBatson, 476 U.S. 79.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103-04 (Marshall, J., concurring).
1o Batson, 476 U.S. at 104. The Dallas County Prosecutor used a manual for jury selection that
encouraged prosecutors to eliminate "any member of a minority group." See id. (quoting J. VAN DYKE,
JURY SELECTION PROCEDURE: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS

152 (1977)). "An earlier jury-selection treatise circulated in the same county instructed prosecutors: 'Do
not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how
rich or how well educated.'" Id. at n.3 (quoting Steve McGonigle & Ed Timms, Race Bias PervadesJury
Selection: Prosecutors Routinely Bar Blacks, Study Finds, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1986, at
1A); see aloTompkins v. Texas, 774 S.W.2d 195, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
n Swain, 380 U.S. at 228-29.
12 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring).
13 Batson, 476 U.S. at 129 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike will
build records in support of their claims that peremptory challenges have been exercised in a racially
discriminatory fashion .... ).

" Id. at 96. This part of the rule is from Swain and was first articulated in Castaneda. Se
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 460, 494-95 (1977).
" Batson, at 96.
56 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). This part of the
rule is now considered an indisputable fact in the legal analysis of the use of peremptory challenges in
the removal of racial minorities. In Avery v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that once a defendant
made a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection, it is the responsibility of the state to disprove
the discrimination. See 345 U.S. at 563. In Georgia at that time, jury commissioners would print the
names of Whites on white paper and Blacks on yellow paper. Id. at 560. The slips were placed in a box
and a judge would pull them out and hand them to the sheriff. The sheriff would give them to a clerk to
type and arrange. Id. at 560-61. In Avery's case, the judge pulled approximately sixty slips from the box.
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and 3) these facts and other "relevant circumstances raise an inference" that the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant's race
from the trial jury.' 7
What has resulted in practice is referred to as the Batson hearing. In Batson
hearings, the defendant's lawyer can object if he or she believes the prosecutor is
using peremptory challenges to strike jurors based on race." First, the proceedings
are halted. The trial judge then questions the prosecutor as to his or her reasons for
striking the black jurors in question using peremptory challenges. The prosecutor
articulates reasons for the removals. These reasons must be race neutral. 9 Though
on opposite sides of the Batson holding, Justice Marshall and ChiefJustice Warren
Burger both predicted what would later become the dear problem with Batson.
proof is very difficult.20
Most of the Supreme Court decisions since 1986 can be characterized as
attempts to clarify what constitutes evidence of racially motivated strikes sufficient
to sustain a challenge under Batson. This has led to the Supreme Court looking
beyond the Batson hearing to other aspects of the voir dire in determining the
legitimacy of the race-neutral explanations offered by counsel. For example, the
Supreme Court urged lower courts to look beyond to the "broader patterns of
practice" during jury selection 21 and encouraged an interpretive approach to
evaluating how peremptory challenges were used. Miller-El calls for analysis of the
cultural context in which the strikes occur (e.g., racist history and practices of the
Dallas County District Attorney), a comparative analysis of differences in
treatment between those jurors seated and those removed (e.g., comparison of
Blacks and Whites in the venire), and attention to what is physically taking place in
Id. at 561. The judge testified that he did not discriminate selecting the slips from the box, yet no
African Americans were on the panel. Id. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, concludes,
"The mind ofjustice, not merely its eyes, would have to be blind to attribute such an occurrence to mere
fortuity." Id. at 564 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
1s See PRICE, supra note 2, at 47.
1 Id. at 98 ("The prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular
case to be tried.").
' See id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[D]efendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a prima facie case."); see
also id. at 127-28 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Anything short of a challenge for cause may well be seen
as an 'arbitrary and capricious' challenge.").
21
_Mer-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 253 (2005). In 1985, Thomas Miller-El was sentenced
to death by an all-white jury in Dallas, Texas, after the prosecutor dismissed ten qualified black jurors by
peremptory challenge. Id. at 236. The trial court found under Swain, the guiding case at the time, no
evidence of "systematic exclusion of blacks as a matter of policy" existed. Id. at 236. Miller-El was tried
prior to Batson. See id. While his case was on appeal, the Batson decision changed the standard of
review. Id.; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (changing the applicable standard in 1986). Miller-Es case
was remanded and the trial court held new hearings where the prosecutor justified his removal of the
jurors in question. AMiler-E, 545 U.S. at 236. Miller-El continued to argue the Batson claims as his
case worked its way through the state and federal court systems until it made it to the Supreme Court a
second time. See id. at 236-37.
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the courtroom (e.g., jury shuffles).n Justice David Souter, who wrote for the
majority, focused on two of the practices used in selecting the 1Mer-El jury as
demonstrative of how other associated practices must be taken into account to
evaluate Batson challenges: the first, known in Texas as the jury shuffle; and the
second, the provision of different prefatory statements to black and white members
23
of the venire panel about the death penalty.
The jury shuffle allows either party to request that the clerk of the court literally
shuffle the cards bearing the jurors' names. 24 In Miler-EA a number of the black
jurors were seated at the beginning of the panel, so the prosecutor requested a
25
shuffle, moving the Blacks at the beginning to the end. The prosecution and the
defense spent several weeks literally shuffling the venire panel to arrange jurors in
ways they thought advantageous to their case. 26 The legal commitments and rules
in place to prevent racial discrimination in peremptory strikes had little impact in
the courtroom, as prosecutors used other tactics to attempt to consistently position
Blacks for exclusion.27
The second practice the Court identified in Miller-El was evidence of
discriminatory juror practices that support a Batson challenge was the use of
different prefatory statements for Blacks and Whites when the prosecutor described
the jurors' role in capital trials.' The statements were offered just prior to
questioning jurors' personal views on the possibility of the death penalty if Thomas
Miller-El were to be convicted.' Ninety-four percent of white jurors heard a fairly
straightforward rendition of the process by which the state would prove Miller-El
guilty and that the jurors would be asked to provide an "affirmative" answer on
'capital murder."" Alternatively, fifty-three percent of African American venire
Miller-E, 545 U.S. at 253-66.
' Id. at 253 ("The first due to the prosecutors' intentions, distinct from the peremptory challenges
themselves, is their resort during voir direto a procedure known in Texas as the jury shuffle."); see also
id. at 255 ("Some of these prefatory statements were cast in general terms, but some followed the socalled graphic script, describing the method of execution in rhetorical and clinical detail.").
24 Either defense counsel or the prosecution can make requests to shuffle the jury. See TEx. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.11 (West 2017).
2
Miller-E, 545 U.S. at 254.
26 The record reflects that both the prosecution and defense asked for shuffles. See id. The Court
found the fact that the defense actually asked for more shuffles than the prosecution irrelevant. See id. at
255 n.14. Justice Souter wrote that the uses of the jury shuffle by the defense did not negate a suspicion
of racial discrimination on the part of the prosecutor. Id.
27 See, e.g., id. at 253; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventingjuries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1169, 1178 (1995) (arguing that racially motivated peremptory challenges "even in
the hands of a defendant, violate the Fifteenth Amendment").
28 Mer-El, 545 U.S. at 255.
29 See id. at 255-56.
0 The full text of the statement was:
22

I feel like it [is] only fair that we tell you our position in this case. The State
of Texas is . . . actively seeking the death penalty in this case for Thomas Joe
Miller-El. We anticipate that we will be able to present to a jury the quantity and
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members and six percent of the white venire members heard what the Court
described as a more "graphic" statement where the prosecutor mentions the "death
house" and the specific method of execution."' The state argued the prefatory
statements provided were based on the jurors' ambivalence toward the death
penalty in an attempt to expose jurors who were "uncertain" about the death
penalty, not the jurors' race.32 The Court found this reason did not fit the facts of
the case, given that black jurors were more likely to hear the latter "graphic"
statement about the death penalty than Whites regardless of their opinion on the
death penalty. 3 The Court concluded that the behavior of the prosecutors in the
Mier-El jury selection, coupled with the Dallas County Prosecutor's history of
racially discriminatory jury practices, was more than sufficient find a Batson
violation.2

type of evidence necessary to convict him of capital murder and the quantity and
type of evidence sufficient to allow a jury to answer these three questions over
here in the affirmative. A yes answer to each of those questions results in an
automatic death penalty from Judge McDowell.
Id. at 255-56.
31 The full text of the statement was:
I feel like you have a right to know right up front what our position is. Mr.
Kinne, Mr. Macaluso and myself, representing the people of Dallas County and
the state of Texas, are actively seeking the death penalty for Thomas Joe MillerEl.. . . We do that with the anticipation that ... at some point Mr. Thomas Joe
Miller-El-the man sitting right down there-will be taken to Huntsville and
will be put on death row and at some point taken to the death house and placed
on a gurney and injected with a lethal substance until he is dead as a result of the
proceedings that we have in this court on this case.
Id. at 256.
32 Id. at 256-57.
3 Id. at 258. It is important to note that the majority and separate opinions in Ailler-El turn on the
Justices' different characterizations of the venire members' responses to the jury questionnaire. The
majority opinion says as much with the following:
The dissent has conducted a similar statistical analysis that it contends
supports the State's argument that the graphic script was used to expose the true
feelings of jurors who professed ambivalence about the death penalty on their
questionnaires. A few examples suffice to show that the dissent's conclusions rest
on characterizations of panel members' questionnaire responses that we consider
implausible.
Id. at 258 n.17 (internal citation omitted).
The fact that the Court, with the primary responsibility for articulating the rules on the use of
peremptory challenges, is divided on how the individual responses of jurors should be interpreted is
telling of the vagaries of evaluating discrimination in the peremptory challenges.
* See id. at 264-66.
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It was not just that the Court felt the need to attend to these other practices.
They were also concerned with the cottage industry of legal training to avoid
Batson error while continuing to use peremptory challenges in discriminatory ways.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer outlines the way "bar journal
article[s]," "trial consulting firm[s]," and "materials" from legal organizations have
more broadly systematized "the use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the
jury-selection."3 ' The levels of discrimination in peremptory strikes also persist
largely due to the type of how-to training in avoiding Batson error. For example, a
study of peremptory strikes between 2003 and 2012 in Caddo Parrish, Louisiana,
found that prosecutors used peremptory strikes to remove forty-six percent of black
qualified potential jurors.3 6 Yet, prosecutors only used peremptory strikes against
fifteen percent of other qualified jurors.3 ' The study also found that in "93 percent
of trials, prosecutors struck a higher percentage of Blacks than of others."" I agree
with Justice Breyer's concurrence in Miller-Eland his concern about the difficulties
of proving that the prosecutors' motives are race neutral when using peremptory
challenges," a point first brought to the Court's attention by Justice Marshall in
Batson. 0 The view that one must look beyond the dialogue between attorney and
juror to determine whether race has been used impermissibly in selecting a capital
jury was reaffirmed in the 2008 United States Supreme Court decision in Snyder v.
Louisiana.41 The Court looked at the dialogue between prosecutor and the venire
person and other aspects of selection including the handling of other jurors who
offered similar testimony.
Snyder makes clear that the entirety of the jury selection process could be used
to determine whether the reasons proffered are truly race neutral. The Court's
analysis, however, was confined to the on-the-record tactics, or those actions taken
as part of litigation visible to all parties in the courtroom, used by the litigants (e.g.,
prefatory statements, comparative analysis, numbers of peremptory strikes used
against one particular race). 42 Foster v. Chatman, decided three decades after

s Id. at 270-71 (Breyer, J., concurring).
"Ursula Noye, Blackstrikes: A Study of the Racially DisparateUse of Peremptory Challenges by
the Caddo Parish District Attorney's Ofice, REPRIEVE AUSTRALIA 2, 8 (Aug. 2015),
https-//blackstrikes.com/resources/BlackstrikesCaddoParishAugust-2015.pdf
[https*//perma.cc/H4YB-BFPW] [hereinafter "Noye Study"].
3 Id. at 8.
" Adam Liptak, New Questionson RacialGap in FillngJuries,N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 17, 2015, at Al
(citing Noye Study, supra note 36, at 9).
3 See Miller-E, 545 U.S. at 266-68 (Breyer, J., concurring) (illustrating the practical problems of
proof that Justice Marshall described).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008). The Court looks at the dialogue between
prosecutor and the venire person and other aspects of selection including the handling of other jurors
who offered similar testimony. See id. The entirety of the jury selection process is used to determine
whether the reasons proffered are truly race neutral. See id.
42 Id
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Batson, extends the review of a case to materials and actions not performed
openly. 43
Timothy Foster was convicted of capital murder in Georgia in 1987."
Prosecutors used peremptory challenges to strike all of the black jurors who could
not be struck for cause during Foster's trial. 45 Foster raised a Batson challenge
during trial and empaneled the jury." After sentencing, Foster raised the Batson
claim as part of a motion for a new trial.4 7 The trial court again rejected the claim
after an evidentiary hearing, and Foster appealed." Foster submitted several
requests under the Georgia Open Records Act to gain access to the state's file from
his trial. 49 The State of Georgia turned over files that included documents related
to jury selection.5 0 Among those documents were: 1) four copies of the jury venire
list with "[a] legend in the upper right corner of the lists indicat[ing] that the green
highlighting 'represents Blacks'" and "[t]he letter 'B' also appeared next to each
black prospective juror's name";51 2) a hand-written document titled, "definite
NOs" with a list of six juror including five black jurors first; 52 3) "A handwritten
document titled 'Church of Christ[,]'" and "[a] notation on the document read:
'NO. No Black Church'";53 and 4) "[t]he questionnaires that had been completed
by several of the black prospective jurors" with each one indicating his or her race
circled.14 The prosecutor's notes indicated the desire to prevent the black jurors
from being seated and that these materials were widely circulated through the
prosecutor's office. There were significant objections by trial attorneys who argued
that they had not made the markings and that they "did not rely on the highlighted
jury venire list in making [the] decision on how to use .. . peremptory strikes." 5
The Court reviewed the race-neutral reasons the prosecutors offered during the
Batson hearing in Foster's trial, but reaffirmed that these reasons must be evaluated
in the context of an additional of showing "purposeful discrimination" as outlined
in Snyder v. Louisian.5 6 The Court concludes that the strikes of at least two of the
Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1753, 1755 (2016).
Id. at 1740.
45 Id. at 1742.
4 Id. at 1743.
47
Id.
4

4

48 Id.

Id.; see alsoGA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-70 to 50-18-77 (West 2017).
Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743.
s1 Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1744.
5
2 Id.; see also Crimesider Staff, Supreme Court Throws Out Death Sentence from AU- White Jury,
CBS NEWS (May 23, 2016, 1253 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-throws-outdeath-sentence-from-al-white-jury/ [https//perma.cc/P7QZ-5FSR] ("The sixth person on the list was
a white woman who made clear she would never impose the death penalty .... [a]nd yet even that
woman ranked behind the black jurors.").
s Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1744.
5 Id.
ss Id. at 1745.
56 See id. at 1747 (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552
U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008)).
49
5
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black jurors were "motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.""s Were it
not for the release of the notes and materials associated with jury selection, this
component may have been impossible to prove in Foster's case. It is clear from the
evidence in pre-Batsoncases that cultures of discrimination were deeply entrenched
and the continued patterns of peremptory strikes against Blacks offers no evidence
of any significant cultural shifts.ss Although the Batson hearing was a significant
intervention, it remains a weak instrument to resolve ongoing problems of
discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges." Ferreting out motivations has
always been the challenge in determining the discriminatory uses of peremptory
challenges. Justice Thurgood Marshall was waving this cautionary flag about the
nearly impossible task of proving discrimination in these cases in his concurrence in
Batson."' Justice Marshall argues that the "seat-of-the-pants instincts" lauded as
the benefit of peremptory challenges to trial lawyers "may often be just another
term for racial prejudice."' Marshall states that "[e]ven if all parties approach the
Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions," the levels of subconscious
racism an individual possesses on which these "instincts" might be based and that
exist in the larger society requires a high level of awareness on the part of the
prosecutor and the courts. 6 2 What we have seen instead is a high level of systematic
resistance to the Court's laudable aims in Batson. Stephen Bright, attorney for
Foster and keynote speaker to the KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL 2016 Symposium on
this topic, argues that the dynamics of the current system make successful claims
" Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1754 (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478, 485).

SSee, e.g., Gilad Edelman, Why Is it So Easy for Prosecutors to Strike Black Jurors?, NEW
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-is-it-so-easy-for(June 5, 2015),
YORKER
prosecutors-to-strike-black-jurors [https:/perma.cc/753X-ZD3Y]. Many suggested the Batson hearing
was not sufficient:
In a 1996 opinion, an Illinois appellate judge, exasperated by "the charade
that has become the Batson process," catalogued some of the flimsy reasons for
striking jurors that judges had accepted as "race-neutral": too old, too young,
living alone, living with a girlfriend; over-educated, lack of maturity; unemployed,
employed as a barber; and so on. The judge joked, "New prosecutors are given a
manual, probably entitled, 'Handy Race-Neutral Explanations' or '20 TimeTested Race-Neutral Explanations.'"
Id. Studies in Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania have pointed to the
disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against Blacks. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use
of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Lqgal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA. J.
CONsT. L. 3, 43-45 (2001); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Price, PerformingDiscretionorPerformingDiscrimination, supra note 2, at 96.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105-07 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 106.
62 Id. The maintenance of peremptory challenges not only requires a high level of self-awareness of
a litigator's possible racial bias, as Justice Marshall suggests, but also an ability, from visual assessments,
to appropriately categorize members of the venire by race. See id. Most jurisdictions do not include race
as a question on juror forms which is likely why the lawyers put handwritten markings on the juror
questionnaires in Foster. See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1744 (2016).
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difficult. Bright suggests, "It's very hard politically with elected judges, very hard
psychologically with judges and prosecutors who work together all the time, for a
judge to make that finding."6 1
So, what are we to make of Barson v. Kentucky thirty years later? What have we
learned? The critical lesson is the Supreme Court's enduring commitment to a
particularized inquiry and remedy to racially biased uses of peremptory challenges.
Even as the composition of the Court has changed, the Court has continued to
find Batson error, or the unconstitutional use of race in in peremptory strikes,
based on an expanding understanding of what constitutes proof in the immediate
case. Even with very strong dissents over the years, the Court has stayed the course
in Batson. I believe Batson has been so consistently been upheld for the reasons
articulated by Justice Lewis Powell in the majority opinion. The decision's
requirement that "trial courts ... be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges .

.

. enforces the mandate of equal protection and furthers

the ends of justice."' Justice Powell also makes dear that "[i]n view of the
heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice
system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is
disqualified from jury service because of his race."6 s
Similar to the aftermath of Batson v. Kentucky, each successive iteration of the
Court's decision on racial bias in the use of peremptory challenges has left
questions about how far the inquiry extends. How far do we go beyond the Batson
hearing to establish an error? Fosterrepresents the greatest expansion thus far. It
will be the rare case that can put forward the kind of proof Fosteraccessed through
state open records laws. But the use of the prosecutor's handwritten notes begs the
question of what kind of evidence will be permitted next. Is it permissible to
provide evidence of purposeful discrimination once the defendant has established a
prima facie case of racially motivated peremptory strikes? Legal scholars and
activists like Michelle Alexander have pointed to the role of bias in the criminal
justice system and its impact on mass incarceration. 6 Could the social scientific
research that points to systemic bias at some point be utilized to provide evidence
of purposeful discrimination under Snyded?
Prior Supreme Court decisions make the success of systemic arguments too
broad,'6 7 but what about similar studies closer to the events of a defendant's trial?
' Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Takes on Racial Discriminationin Jury Selection, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Nov. 2, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/02/452898470/supreme-court-takeson-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection [https://perma.cc/VX99-8G6T].
665 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
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See generallyMICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEWJIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE

AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012) (analyzing mass incarceration in the criminal justice system

in the context of the caste system).
67 In McCleskey v. Kemp, the court rejects the use of large statistical studies as proof of
discrimination in a particular case. Sec 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987), rehk denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987) ("In
light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value ofjury trial
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Would the extensive research on the experiences of all persons who enter and
conduct business at the courthouse, with particular attention to jury service,
conducted by the Racial Fairness Commission of Jefferson County, Kentucky, be
closely enough linked to a particular defendant's case to show a purposeful intent of
discrimination? 6 This question is particularly salient given that this is the
jurisdiction where Batson originated. Almost three decades later, the courts and the
community that brought this question to the Supreme Court are still working out
how to provide fair access to the jury box for their black citizens and fair trials to
defendants who have a right to a jury untainted by racial bias.69
At some point the Supreme Court will find evidence that suggests bias too
attenuated from the trial of the defendant to sustain a Batson claim. As yet, we do
not know where that line is. The challenge of Batson is to continue in our efforts at
ensure access to the jury box is unimpeded by racial discrimination.

in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold
that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the
Georgia capital sentencing process.").
" The Racial Fairness Commission was organized to focus on four areas: sentencing, bail issues,
courtroom environment, and jury selection. See Commission on Racial Fairness in the Courts
Resolution, KY.GOV (Jan. 23, 2009), http://migration.kentucky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/54878A2B-30134688-A40E-825974475005/184178/RacialFairnessCommissionResolutionl2309.pdf
[https*//perma.cc/6XFD-EXKS]. Kentucky Court of Appeals Judge Denise Clayton says, "African
Americans should make up about 21 percent of a jury panel in Jefferson County. But earlier this
month, it was more like 15 percent." Kentucky Lawmaker Pushingfor Larger]uryPool, FDgherPay for
Jurors, WDRB (Sept. 27, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://www.wdrb.com/story/33263247/ky-lawmakerThe Racial
[https://perma.cc/AE7X-E9SQ].
pushing-for-larger-jury-pool-higher-pay-for-jurors
Fairness Commission was created in 2001 by the then Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court,
Joseph Lambert, to "examine the judicial process in Jefferson County" and to be "composed of a diverse
collection of judges, lawyers, civil rights proponents, and leaders within the African American
community." See Commission on RacialFairnessin the CourtsResolution, supra.
6 See, e.g., Martha Neil, Wasludge Right to DismissJury Due to Lack of Black Members? Top
(Oct.
26,
2015,
5:45
AM),
To
Decide,
ABA
J.
State
Court
http://www.abajournal.com/news/artide/wasjudgeright-todismiss-jury-dueto_1ack-ofblackmem
bers-top-state-cour [https.//perma.cc/57RM-GFW9] (analyzing the controversy in Jefferson County,
Kentucky, over a circuit court judge's dismissal of a jury because it had no black jurors).

